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ABSTRACT

RACHEL MORGAN WEST: Change in the European Court of Human Rights: Accession
of Eastern and Central European Member States
(Under the direction of Charles H. Brower)

The research idea originated as a result of interest in Russian human rights which then
expanded to include all of Eastern and Central Europe.

This work seeks to explore the

effects of the Council of Europe’s (COE) Eastern and Central European member states on the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR or the “Court”).

The in-depth publishings of

ECHR itself provided the greatest source of information for this work.

Part I provides a brief

history of the ECHR up to 1989 when expansion to Eastern and Central European states first
became possible. Parts II, III, and IV focus on three problematic consequences to the ECHR

after extending membership to the emerging democracies of the former Soviet bloc:
overwhelming

an

caseload, transformation in the nature of cases, and recurring patterns of

human rights violations in certain member states. Together, Parts I through IV establish how
the introduction of new members could so noticeably alter the character of the COE and the
effectiveness of the ECHR.

Part V uses these findings to draw broader lessons regarding

proposals to expand membership of organizations like the European Union and NATO.
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INTRODUCTION
After the destruction and brutality of World War II, Western European states established

the Council of Europe (COE) in 1949 as the first international organization designed to promote

European integration. The following year, COE members adopted the European Convention for
the Protection of Human

Rights and Fundamental

became the world's first human rights treaty.

Freedoms

(European

Convention)

which

Contemporaneously, COE members established a

European Court of Human Rights (ECHR or “the Court”) to monitor the performance of treaty
obligations, which celebrated its 50" judicial year this January.

Due in part to the similar

political and legal traditions of the COE's early members, the ECHR quickly became one of the

world's most effective international courts.

Despite a modest number of claims during the

Court's early years, the ECHR's caseload quickly reached substantial numbers; allocating 404
applications to a decision body in 1980 alone.'

After only twenty years, the Court had rendered

judgments on 37 cases concerning both interstate and individual disputes.” However, the ECHR
adequately coped with that caseload due in part to the fact that most cases raised issues of
secondary importance (such as the right of liberty and security in regards to lawful arrest or the
right to a fair and timely trail) and only required the application of the European Convention to
agreed facts.
The

fall

of the

Soviet

bloc

in

1989,

however,

prompted

the

COE's

extension

of

membership to emerging democracies in Eastern Europe which consequently produced three

When applications are made on the application form provided by the Registry and are accompanied by copies of
all relevant documents, they are “allocated to a decision body” which opens the way to judicial examination.
(This is the equivalent to what was previously referred to as “registering an application”.); Statistics found in:
Turpin, Colin, and Adam Tomkins. British Government and the Constitution : Text and Materials. New York:

Cambridge UP, (2007): 265-6
“Chronological List of Judgments and Published Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.” Council of
Europe. Nov. 2008. Can be found at: <http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/15e0e23d-8d4a-4b53-b4839b443ab99aa3/0/listechrono.pdf>.

problematic consequences for the ECHR:

an overwhelming caseload, transformation

in the

nature of cases, and recurring patterns of human rights violations in certain member states which
collectively began to undermine

the court's effectiveness.

ECHR, application processing becomes increasingly difficult.

As cases accumulate

before the

In contrast to the figure of 1980,

the number of applications registered in 1998 had risen more than ten-fold to 5,981.
December

of 2008, the total number

staggering figure of 97,300.’

By

of applications pending before the Court reached the

While the ECHR considers that, ideally, a case should be finally

disposed of within two years, the present caseload exceeds the Court’s capacity, with the result
that progression through the system often requires four or five years.” Those cases which finally
do see a judgment, of course, represent a small fraction (typically less than five
those initially registered

with the Court.

Additionally,

the increased

per cent) of

frequency

of cases

involving violations of non-derogable rights involving physical security (for example the right to
life and freedom from torture) require more complex proceedings and force the Court to reorient
its jurisprudence. Also, the development of reoccurring patterns of violations by particular states
suggests a reduction in the court's effectiveness as measured

by the implementation

of its

decisions.
Under the circumstances just described, the COE's experience with new members may
provide a cautionary tale about the expansion of international organizations. As demonstrated by
the ECHR, rapid expansion can alter an organization’s character and tax its resources beyond
capacity.
>

In fact, the problems of assimilating emerging democracies may serve as an illustration

Robert Harmsen , "The Eruopean Convention on Human Rights after Enlargement." The International Journal of
Human Rights Winter 5 (2001): 26
“Annual Report 2008 of the European Court of Human Rights (provisional edition)” Jan. 2007. Council of
Europe. p. 125 <http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/69564084-9825-430B-9
150A9137DD22737/0/SurveyofActivities2006.pdf>.
Paraskeva, Costas. "Reforming the European Court of Human Rights: An Ongoing Change." Nordic Journal of
International Law 76 (2007): 185-216.
“The European Court of Human Rights: Some Facts and Figures 1998-2008” ECHR, p.4-5.

of the consequences likely to flow from premature expansion of NATO and the EU to Eastern
and Central European states.
Seeking to develop the points just made, Part I of this paper provides a brief narrative of
the ECHR's

history, importance,

and successes before the fall of the Berlin Wall.

introduces the most obvious problems facing the ECHR after 1989:
Among

Part II

an overwhelming caseload.

other things, this section addresses the contribution of new members

to a growing

judicial backlog while also developing the theme that justice delayed is justice denied.

Part III

examines the ECHR's jurisprudential reorientation towards cases involving physical security in
emerging democracies. Additionally, a study of major organizational and operational reforms of

the past

two

decades

will

jurisprudential reorientation.

illustrate the ECHR's

to address

the problems

of

Part IV, in turn, will describe the problem of recurring patterns of

violations in Eastern European members
inability to uphold the right to life).
introduction of new members
effectiveness of the ECHR.

attempts

(such as repeated applications concerning Russia's
Together, Parts I through IV will establish how

could so noticeably alter the character of the COE

the

and the

Part V will use these findings to draw broader lessons regarding

proposals to expand membership of organizations like the European Union and NATO.

PART I
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE 1989
After five devastating years of World War II, European states resolved to prevent such a
tragedy

from

happening

again.

The

horrors

of the

war

stimulated

internationally a tremendous concern for human rights protection.

for

the

first

time

The way forward for many

Western states seemed to lie with the protection of constitutional democracy and human rights in

much more effective international institutions.

In 1945 leaders of the world formed the United

Nations, a global association of governments facilitating international cooperation.

Although

the UN's Charter and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights addressed human rights and
fundamental freedoms, progress in the realm of human rights continued to move slowly and the
process of developing a treaty stalled at the global level.

Concern from European states, which

suffered the war's greatest casualties, gave way to the view that their recovery, prosperity, and
security required tailor-made arrangements, including a regional human rights regime.’

Efforts to find common solutions to the challenges afflicting post-war society culminated
with the creation of the first European organization after WWII, the Council of Europe.®

Its

goals focused on building a new, united Europe on a solid foundation of shared values and
principles, those of pluralist democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The COE was to be
the guardian of these fundamental and interconnected values and principles. ° As a means of
developing its goals, the COE created the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms in 1950.

This was Europe's first expression of commitment to the

international protection of human rights and it was the first international treaty to legally bind
members to the principles set forth in the Universal Declaration.'°
In order to monitor the performance of treaty obligations, the European

Convention

established three institutions based in Strasbourg, France: the European Commission of Human
Rights (Commission), the European Court of Human Rights, and the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe (Committee of Ministers), which is composed of the Ministers of Foreign
Greer, Steven, Laurence Gormley, and Jo Shaw.
Problems and Prospects.

The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements,

New York: Cambridge UP, 2006: 12

The founding members of the COE were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, and The United Kingdom.
Shelton, Dinah. Regional Protection of Human Rights. New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2008: 18

“Survey of Activities 1950-1998 of the European Court of Human Rights.” Council of Europe. Sept. 1998. p.1
<http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/66F2CD35-047E-44F4-A95D890966820E81/0/Surveyapercus_19591998.pdf>.

Affairs of the Members States or their representatives.

The Convention allowed for complaints

to be brought against contracting states either by another state or by individual applicants who
have exhausted all legal remedies at the national level.

However, under the original European

Convention, states had the option of granting the right of individual application, therefore this
right was only applicable to those states which had accepted it.

Recognition of the Court's

jurisdiction was also optional, although all member states had accepted it in practice."

Article 19 of the European Convention originally arranged for two judicial bodies: the
Court

and

the

Commission

to work

intermediary role, protecting the ECHR

alongside

each

other.

from unfounded

suits.

The

Commission

All complaints

played

an

brought by

individuals or contracting states first appeared before the Commission which determined their
admissibility.
Commission
adjudication.

After first attempting to mediate a settlement between

involved parties, the

could then present cases on behalf of the claimant to the ECHR

for binding

The Commission also had the ability to refer its reports to the Committee of

Ministers, a political body to decide the European Convention’s violation. Although individuals
could only be heard through the Commission, never before had they possessed so much power in
the international arena.
mechanisms

Prior to the creation of the European

for enforcement,

Convention and its various

individuals were unable to bring complaints of human

abuses concerning their own governments before an international court.

rights

This was the same for

one government's ability to bring a case concerning another government's treatment of its own
people.

From the beginning of the Court's operation, the vast majority of cases submitted have

come from individual members of the general public.'”

''
"2

“Survey of Activities 1950-1998 of the European Court of Human Rights.” Council of Europe. Sept. 1998. p.1
Survey of Activities 1950-1998,p. 27-38; The Conscience of Europe. Prod. Council of Europe. 2007.

The first judgment delivered by the court in 1960 for the case, Lawiless v. Ireland," also
concerned

the first application

by an individual

against that person’s

state of nationality.

Lawless lost the case due to an interpretation of Article 15 (derogation of obligations in time of
war or public emergency) that found the Irish government to be acting in the interest of the
nation.

Ireland's use of diplomacy and guile to handle the case was characteristic of the Court

and Commission's first years of operation, in that international politics often resolved matters
before they reached the ECHR."
cases before

1970.'°

In fact, the Court had produced judgments on a mere seven

Increased awareness of the European

Convention

and its monitoring

machinery, however, encouraged greater activity in the next decade of the Court's existence.
Before 1980 the ECHR had more than doubled its performance by delivering judgments on an
additional 20 cases.

The Court's caseload only continued to rise and by the end of 1989, the

Court had received a total of 161 judgments.

The great majority of violations found in these

three decades concerned obligations not deemed fundamental to the rights of man; mainly the
right of liberty and security in regards to lawful arrest (Article 5), the right to a fair and timely
trial (Article 6), and the right to respect for privacy (Article 7).'° Furthermore, those cases only
required the application

of the European

Convention

to agreed

facts, which

fostered

the

expeditious disposal of cases, usually within one to two years.!”
The ECHR's first judgment concerning an inter-State case arrived in January of 1978 for
the case Ireland v. United Kingdom'® in which the Government of Ireland lodged a case against
the Government of the United Kingdom.

3

Due to a

series of extrajudicial powers of arrest,

Lawless v. UK, No. 332/57, 14 November 1960
“Survey of Activities 1950-1998 of the European Court of Human Rights.” Council of Europe. Sept. 1998. p.1

'S Survey of Activities 1950-1998, p. 27
'6 Survey of Activities 1950-1998, pp. 27-38

'7 Survey of Activities 1950-1998, pp. 27-38
'8

Ireland v. UK, No. 5310/71, 18 January 1978 para. 11

10

detention, and internment committed in Northern Ireland by British authorities, the Court ruled
that Article 3 of the European Convention (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment) had been violated.
gave a solemn undertaking in March

As a result of the case, the British Prime Minister

1972 that the five interrogation techniques, which were

later found to be in breach of Article 3, would no longer be employed.

In addition, measures

were taken to ensure that prisoners would be properly treated (medical examinations, rigorous
procedures for investigating complaints, strict instructions to the security forces).

Despite the availability of inter-State proceedings and the fact that Article 33

has

permitted inter-State cases since the Convention's entry into force, the ECHR has seen relatively
few of these cases.

Most

inter-State cases concern widespread violation of human

although this is not a requirement for admissibility or jurisdiction.

rights,

The goal of such cases is to

provide an effective means for securing a minimum standard of human rights protection in all
Convention States, for example Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece of
1967 concerned serious violations of the prohibition against torture following a military coup
d'etat in the latter country.'?

However, the ability of Contracting Members to invoke inter-State

cases for collective protection is rarely called upon because States are typically unwilling to
lodge complaints outside of their special interest. In fact, such measures generally run counter to
their interest in that complaints against another State can be considered unfriendly acts.”°
The
compliance.”

ECHR's
21

first 30 years of judgments

were met with a generally high level of

Article 46 of the European Convention requires that States “undertake to abide by

the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.”

20

2)

Court judgments are of a

Shelton, Dinah. Regional Protection of Human Rights. New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2008. p.890
Van Dijk, Pieter, G. J. Van Hoof, and A. W. Heringa. Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human

Rights. 3rd ed. New York: Kluwer Law International, 1998. p.43
“Survey of Activities 1950-1998 of the European Court of Human Rights.” Council of Europe. Sept. 1998. p.87

11

declaratory nature character in that they simply establish whether the Convention

has been

violated,

financial

and

may

compensation.”
measures

towards

be

accompanied

by

a

decision

under

Article

50

about

Full compliance with judgments depends upon States to actively seek general
the prevention

of violations in question.

payment obligations may be easily concluded,”

While

a state’s fulfillment of

its ability to take measures to prevent the

recurrence of certain violations requires much more detailed investigation.

Under Article 46(2),

“the final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall
supervise its execution.”

Reports compiled by the Committee show a great deal of success in

judgment compliance through the alteration of domestic legislation and case law between 1959
and 1989. Reports on the measures taken for 79 different cases during this time (out of 161 total
judgments) reveal the willingness of member states to follow to the Court’s decisions.
example, following the judgment in the case of Golder v. the United Kingdom”

For

concerning

violation of the right to fair trial, England and Wales altered their domestic law to accommodate
the ruling.

Within a year of the judgment, the Prison Rules of 1964 were amended so that leave

for a prisoner to institute civil proceedings would always be granted.

Although the long term

effects of such revisions are difficult to determine, the Court's influence on any state's decision
which seeks to fulfill the spirit of the European Convention constitutes a success.
As the credibility of the human rights protection system depends to a great extent on the
execution of the Court's judgments,”° member states’ high compliance with judgments illustrates
the ECHR's effectiveness during its first thirty years of performance.

22
23

The Court's success even

Van Dijk, Pieter, G. J. Van Hoof, and A. W. Heringa. Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human
Rights. 3rd ed. New York: Kluwer Law International, 1998. p.21
Survey of Activities 1950-1998, p.87.

4 Golder v. UK, No. 4451/70, 21 February 1975
5 Survey of Activities 1950-1998
*©

Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers. The Group of Wise Persons, Council of
Europe. 2006.

12

earned it the title of “The Conscience of Europe.”””

As was celebrated at the Court’s fiftieth

anniversary this January, many international courts such as the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice’® regularly refer to and cite the
case law of the ECHR

in their own judgments.

Drezemczewski,

Head

of the Monitoring

Department of the Directorate of Strategic Planning of the Council of Europe, states that “it
would be difficult to deny that the European Convention and its case law have had a profound

effect in preventing many human rights violations.””’

PART II
MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION AND CASELOAD GROWTH

In contrast to other trans-national courts which only handle a few cases per year, such as
the WTO Appellate Body, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, International Court of Justice,

or the International Criminal Court, the ECHR processes many thousands of cases annually.
However, the most obvious

and threatening problem facing the ECHR

today involves the

backlog created by a precipitous rise in individual applications, especially from Eastern and
Central Europe.

As explained below, the COE’s ambition to consolidate Europe through eastern

expansion greatly increased the ECHR’s annual caseload, ultimately jeopardizing the Court’s
own ability to uphold an individual’s right to a fair and expeditious trial.

In other words, the

consequences of increased membership and a growing caseload seriously threaten the Court’s
continued effectiveness.

27.

The Conscience of Europe. Prod. Council of Europe. 2007.

Higgins, R. “The International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights : Partners for the
Protection of Human Rights”. At the Ceremony marking the 50th Anniversary of the European Court of Human
Rights 30 January 2009
Drezemezewski, A. “The Prevention of Human Rights Violations: Monitoring Mechanisms of the Council of
Europe”, Jnternational Studies in Human Rights 67 (2001 ), 155.

13

With figures growing exponentially each year, the ECHR now toils in the shadow of an
insurmountable caseload.

Between 1998 and 2008, the figure for applications lodged*® annually

rose by nearly 600 per cent — that is, from 5,109 applications in 1998 to 42,376 new applications
lodged in 2008.7!

Because the Court is unable to dispose of the same number of applications as

are being received each year, a rising backlog now threatens the ECHR. *’ Although only 14 per
cent of applications are eventually declared admissible, the Court must still expend a great deal
of energy and resources sorting through the new cases being lodged.

The increasing number of

applications received each year poses a threat to the effectiveness of the system and the ECHR

itself admitted that it has difficulty processing applications in a reasonable time.’ The Court set
a “one-year target” as the maximum acceptable duration of the proceedings from allocation of
the first examination of admissibility, from communication to a decision on admissibility, and
from admissibility to the delivery of judgment.

It currently takes about five years, however,

between the lodging of a complaint with the Registry and the delivery of judgment on the merits
by the Court,** delaying the ECHR's ability to guide member states in the implementation of the
European Convention.
Interestingly enough, around 35 per cent of total violations found by the Court between
1998 and 2008 concerned Article 6 of the Convention under which states must guarantee a fair

trial and judgment within a reasonable time.*> For example, in EO and VP v. Slovakia®® family
proceedings lasting four years and 13 days (EO) and three years, nine months, and six days (VP)
©
31
32
33

34

An application is lodged (previously referred to as “opened applications”) after the Court first receives a
complaint, assigns it an application number and then records it in the Court's database.
See Tables 1 and 2; The European Court of Human Rights. Some Facts and Figures 1998-2008. (2008):14-15.
Applications are disposed of either by a judgment being delivered or by a decision of inadmissibility
Position Paper of the ECHR on Proposals for Reform of the ECHR and Other measures as Set Out in the Report
of the CDDH of 4 April 2003, CDDH-GDR (2003) 024, para. 4.
Greer, Steven, Laurence Gormley, and Jo Shaw. The European Convention on Human Rights : Achievements,
Problems and Prospects. New York: Cambridge UP, 2006, p.38.

35

“The European Court of Human Rights: Some Facts and Figures 1998-2008” ECHR, p.13.
EO and VP vy. Slovakia, No. 56193/00 and 57581/00, 27 April 2004

14

violated the applicants' rights to an expeditious trial.

Similarly, in the case of Kudla v. Poland’”

the Court found that criminal proceedings (concerning fraud and forgery) lasting more than nine
years constituted a violation of Article 6(1).

Applicants from Steel and Morris v. UK were

involved in the longest trial in English legal history (lasting from September

1990 to March

2000) which the Court found to be a substantial Article 6 violation.*®
As Court procedures lag under the caseload burden, applicants who have exhausted all
domestic legal remedies before taking their case to the Court’? must wait longer for justice.

As

Lord Woolf said, “If ‘justice delayed is justice denied’, then a large proportion of the Court’s
applicants — even those who are the victims of serious violations — are effectively denied the
justice they seek.”*?

Furthermore, as a result of the Grand Chamber judgment in the previously

mentioned Kudla v. Poland, violations of Article 6 may also include the violation of Article 13,
the denial of an effective remedy.*'

Rolv Ryssdal, former President of the ECHR, pointed out

that the failure to comply with one of the most fundamental guarantees of Article 6 (and now
Article 13) is in danger of becoming a common feature of the European Convention system.”
The Registry of the ECHR
caseload.

has had to grow in order to accommodate

the increased

While this takes a burden off judges, it also strains the resources of the COE.”

The

Court’s budget derives from the COE’s general budget, decided annually by the Committee of
Ministers.

This not only increased from €7 million in 1989 (including that attributed to the

Kudla v. Poland, No. 30210/96, 26 October 2000
Steel and Morris v. The United Kingdom, 15 February 2005, Application No. 68416/01.
Article 35 of the European Convention
The Right Honourable The Lord Woolf, "Review of the Working Methods of the European Court of Human
Rights." Review. Dec. 2005. 3 Feb. 2009
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2005/Dec/LORD
WOOLFSREVIEWON WORKINGMETHODS2.pdf>.
41

42
43

Leach, Philip, and Nicolas Bratza. Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights. Ed. John Wadham.

New York: Blackstone P, 2005. pp. 261-261
R. Ryssdal, “The Comin of Age of the European Convention on Human Rights”, | European Human Rights Law

Review (1996) p.22.
Paraskeva, Costas. "Reforming the European Court of Human Rights: An Ongoing Change." Nordic Journal of
International Law 76 (2007): 204.
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former Commission on Human

Rights) to €41.7 million, in 2005, but has also accounted

for a

continuously increasing proportion of the COE’s total budget , rising from 10 per cent in 1989 to
16.2 per cent in the draft budget for 2002.

The bulk of the Court’s funds are spent on staffing.

The number of permanent officials at the ECHR’s Registry alone rose from 74 in 1989 to 484 in
2005."°

Other costs include informational technology, legal aid to applicants, and, increasingly,

fact-finding missions to respondent states where particular applications require it.°
The increasing caseload and, consequently, problems abiding by Article 6 initiated a
movement to streamline the ECHR through the adoption of Protocol No. 11 to the European
Convention.

Protocol No. 11 was created for the purpose of restructuring the Court system so as

to shorten the length of Strasbourg proceedings.””
single, full-time Court
Convention.”®

composed

It did so by dissolving the Commission into a

of an equal number

of judges to that of parties to the

These judges sit as Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand

Chamber of 17 judges. The Court utilizes a number of judge “rapporteurs” as well as committees
to replace the closed down Commission which was responsible for examining the admissibility
and merits of submitted applications.

The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe still

supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments.
Individual applicants gained a great deal of power from Protocol No. 11.

The optional

character of the right to individual application was abolished and applicants gained direct access

“4
45

Report of the Evaluation Group to the Committee of Ministers on the European Court of Human Rights, EG
Court (2001) 1, 27 September 2001 paras. 16-17
Greer, Steven, Laurence Gormley, and Jo Shaw. The European Convention on Human Rights : Achievements,

Problems and Prospects. New York: Cambridge UP, 2006. p.36; Paraskeva, Costas. "Reforming the European
Court of Human Rights: An Ongoing Challenge." Nordic Journal of International Law 76 (2001): 137.
“©

Greer, 137.

“ Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 11 (1998): 10-18
“8

Prior to Protocol No. 11 individual applicants applied to the European Commission of Human Rights, which
would launch a case in the Court on the individual's behalf; European Convention on Human Rights

16

to the Court.”

In the years which

followed

the entry into force of Protocol

No.

11 the

productivity of the ECHR increased considerably; the new ECHR delivered more judgments in
two years than its predecessor in 39 years.*”

Despite the Protocol's achievements, statistics

clearly reveal that the changes failed to reduce the enormous disparity between disposed of
applications

and those being newly lodged each year!

As former ECHR

President Luzius

Wildhaber described, “The continuing steep increase in the number of applications to the Court
is putting even the new system under pressure.” Wildhaber goes on to describe the Court's

newest obstacle, “The volume of work is already daunting, but it is set to become more
challenging still, especially as applications come in from countries which ratified the European

Convention on Human Rights in the late 1990s.”°? When drafting Protocol No. 11, the authors
failed to consider the potential magnitude of cases that could be brought against the new
contracting states of the former Communist bloc.
Of the factors which contribute to the ECHR’s current exponential caseload growth, the
addition of Eastern and Central European member states has, undoubtedly, been one of the
largest. In the early 1990’s, Eastern and Central European states transitioning out of communism
sought membership with the COE and its “club of democracies.”** Despite a poor human rights
record in these states, the COE extended membership to the East in hopes of integrating a “wider

Paraskeva, Costas. "Reforming the European Court of Human Rights: An Ongoing Challenge." Nordic Journal
of International Law 76 (2001): 202.
50
51

Press Release issued by the Registrar of the ECHR, 5 December 2000.
The European Court of Human Rights. Some Facts and Figures 1998-2008. (2008):14-19.

52

Press Release issued by the Registrar of the ECHR, 21 June 1999.

53

Hioureas, Christina G. "Behind the Scenes of Protocol No. 14: Politics in Reforming the European Court of

54

convention on Human Rights: Towards Protocol 14, P.L. 2003, 663.
Sudre, Frederic. “La Communaute europeenne et les droits fondamentaux aprés les Traite d’Amsterdam:

Human Rights." Berkeley Journal of International Law 24 (2006): 723; Steven Greer, Reforming the European
Vers

un nouveau systeme europeen de protection des droits de l’homme?’, La Semain Juridique, 7 Jan. 1998, pp. 916.
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family

of

European

pluralist

democracies.”°>

In

doing

so,

the

COE

experienced

an

unprecedented amount of growth and in less than two decades the COE's membership jumped

from twenty-three member states in 1990 to a current total of forty-seven states, consisting of

800 million citizens.°°

Graph 1: Number of Applications Allocated to a Judicial Body between 1992 and 2008°”
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Robert Harmsen , "The European Convention on Human Rights after Enlargement." The International Journal of
Human Rights Winter 5 (2001): 21. See also: Palmer, John. "Human rights court to expand." The Guardian
[London] | Oct. 1993, sec. Foreign , Page: 11; Barber, Tony. "Europe's human rights watchdog starts to bite;
“The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe tells Tony Barber in Salonika why ex-Communist states want
to join." The Independent [London] 7 June 1996, sec. International: 10.
The COE is now made up of the following countries: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Georgia, German, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The FYR Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, and The United

57

Kingdom
Figures for the years 1992 through 1998 are adapted from Robert Harmsen , "The Eruopean Convention on
Human Rights after Enlargement." The International Journal of Human Rights Winter 5 (2001): 26. Statistics for
later years are my own calculations based on figures from the annual reports of the ECHR.
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As would

be expected, such an expansion in the ECHR’s jurisdiction amplified the

growing caseload and applications lodged with the Court rocketed from only 5,875 in 1992 to
34,509 just ten years later. Although awareness increased throughout all of Europe as a result of
media interest in the Court's decisions during the 1990's,°® Eastern and Central European citizens

have become particularly aware of their ability to bring a case to the ECHR.*’ As shown above
in Figure 1, states from Eastern and Central Europe have represented an increasingly large

proportion of cases reviewed by the Court. Around 19 per cent of total applications allocated to
a judicial body” were from this region in 1997, but by 2008 the figure rose to approximately 84
per cent.

In November of 2008, Russia (19.3), Romania (10.9), Ukraine (9.8), and Poland (8.8)

had the largest percentage of applications lodged with the ECHR against them. 61

Russia,

in

particular, has been firmly situated at the top of the list of states that have applications registered
against them since 1999.”

Although these numbers are already quite large, they have been

described as just “the tip of the iceberg” as the European Court is still relatively unknown in the
newest member states.

What is saving Strasbourg, as Human Rights Commissioner Alvaro Gil-

Robles explained, is that people still do not know about it.

Additionally, the volume of

applications from the original states is not diminishing; their rates of increase are simply not as
high as those of the COE's newest members.™
The influx of applications from Eastern and Central Europe which currently slows the

8

Greer, Steven, Laurence Gormley, and Jo Shaw. The European Convention on Human Rights : Achievements,

Problems and Prospects. New York: Cambridge UP, 2006. p.36; Paraskeva, Costas. "Reforming the European
Court of Human Rights: An Ongoing Challenge." Nordic Journal of International Law 76 (2001): 197.

Robert Harmsen , "The European Convention on Human Rights after Enlargement." The International Journal of
Human Rights Winter 5 (2001): 27.
60

As previously mentioned, when applications are made on the application form provided by the Registry and are
accompanied by copies of all relevant documents, they are “allocated to a decision body” which opens the way
to judicial examination.

‘| The European Court of Human Rights. Some Facts and Figures 1998-2008. (2008):14-15.
°
8
*

The European Court of Human Rights. Some Facts and Figures 1998-2008. (2008):14-15.
Lord Woolf, “Review of Working Methods of the ECHR”. December 2005. p. 9
The European Court of Human Rights. Some Facts and Figures 1998-2008. (2008):14-15.

19

ECHR's

productivity

was

largely a self-inflicted problem.

Because

these

financially

weak

countries emerging from a long history of totalitarian government were required to ratify the
European Convention within a very short time (typically within a year) after joining the COE,
there was

little time

within

Convention system.

which

to bring their legal

systems

into conformity

Russia, for example was required to ratify the European

with

the

Convention

within one year after its membership, which was quite stringent considering its size and weak
human rights record.

Romania also ratified the Convention after only one year in spite of reports

revealing potential difficulties with compliance due to the economic and social conditions at the
time. 66

Former Deputy Secretary General, Peter Leuprecht, stated that “intellectual honesty

requires acknowledging that some of the countries admitted clearly did not comply with the
statutory requirements at the time of accession.” He further declared that “as far as the European
Convention is concerned, some of the new member states have rushed into ratification without
bringing

domestic

law

and

reality

into

line with

its requirements”.°’

Leuprecht

resigned

dramatically from his post after 37 years of service with the ECHR due to his disagreement with
premature expansion to Eastern and Central Europe.

While he noted the concerted efforts of

some new member states” to bring their systems into line with the requirements of the ECHR,
he equally stressed the lack of any real commitment on the part of some of the other new
member states to respect the undertakings which they had made to meet the standards of the

°°

Wildhaber, “Consequences for the ECHR of Protocol No. 14 and the Resolution on Judgments Revealing an
Underlying Systemic Problem-Practical Steps of Implementation and Challenges”, in Applying and Supervising
the ECHR-Reform of the European Human Rights System, Proceedings of the High-Level Seminar, Oslo, 18
October 2004.
°° The Center for Human Rights Investigation. “ The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights upon
the Romanian Legal System”. Romanian Review of Human Rights. 5 (1994): 65.
*” P. Leuprecht, “Innovations in the European System of Human Rights: Is Enlgargement Compatible with
Reinforcement?”, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1998), pp. 325-35
‘6 Leuprecht cited Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia as examples.
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European Convention.”

By enlarging so quickly with new contracting parties that were likely

unprepared to meet European Convention standards, the COE

brought the problem

of case

overload upon itself.

In short, the unforeseen consequences of the COE's ambition to consolidate a democratic
Europe now diminish the ECHR's ability to perform its fundamental duties. The swift inclusion
of members transitioning to democracy doubled the COE’s membership, therefore, instigating a
sharp rise in the Court’s caseload, greatly straining available resources.

Being unable to manage

this increased workload, the Court began backlogging cases to such a great extent that it now
routinely

infringes

Convention.

applicants’

right

to

a fair and

expeditious

trial

under

the

European

The combined consequences of expansion to Eastern and Central Europe have

challenged the ECHR’s

effectiveness and raise concern for its continued role as a European

human rights protector.

PART III
CHANGING CASES AND JURISPRUDENTIAL REORIENTATION
The challenges facing the Court involve not only the rapid expansion of member states
and the influx of new cases but also a simultaneous transformation in the nature of these cases
and, thus, the Court's function.””

Only in the recent history of the Court have allegations of

torture, arbitrary killing, and other violations of physical security become routine complaints. As
explained below, the rise in complex cases from Eastern and Central Europe require greater
resources from the Court and lower its overall output.

The ECHR

must, therefore, reorient its

jurisprudence to accommodate these cases which stem from troubles transitioning to democracy.
®

P. Leuprecht, “Innovations in the European System of Human Rights: Is Enlgargement Compatible with
Reinforcement?”, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1998), pp. 325-35

”

Woolf, Lord H. (2005) Review of the Working Methods of the European Court of Human Rights, December 2005.
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During its first forty years, the Court mainly sought to protect individuals from the
“excesses of majoritarianism in healthy democracies”.”!

Member states party to the European

Convention during this time were those in which the rule of law had been firmly established and
human rights were, for the most part, highly esteemed and protected.
ECHR

President

Rolv

Ryssdal

people

mainly

used

the ECHR

According to former

to seek

redress

for cases

considered “relatively minor” or for “very ordinary situations.” Most violations found during
this time concerned the rights of liberty and security, fair trial, and respect for private life
(Articles 5, 6, and 8). For example, Italy was involved in many violations concerning the state's
inability to try cases within a reasonable time, such as a case which lasted sixteen years’? . Out of
the 755 total judgments between

1960 and 1997 the Court found only 15 violations of non-

derogable rights” almost half of which were from the United Kingdom.

Besides two violations

of concerning troubles with the Irish Republican Army,” the United Kingdom's violations of
non-derogable rights concerned issues such as the likelihood that applicants deported to another
state may be tortured,”° retrospective criminal penalties,’’ and corporal punishment.”*
Since 1998, however, violations of non-derogable rights have become a more standard
component of cases found on the Court's docket.

For example, between

1998 and 2008

the

ECHR found 128 violations of the right to life, 43 violations of the prohibition of torture, 14
violations of punishment without law, and even one violation of the prohibition of slavery out of
"|

Mahoney, Paul. “New Challenges for the European Court of Human Rights Resulting from the Expanding Case
Load and Membership”, Penn State International Law Review. 21(2002), 110-111.
Greer, Steven, Laurence Gormley, and Jo Shaw.

The European Convention on Human Rights:

Achievements,

Problems and Prospects. New York: Cambridge UP, 2006: 40
B
Ferrantelli and Santangelo v. Italy (No. 19874/92) 7 August 1996
74
Non-derogable rights are those which a state may never take from its citizens, even in times of national
emergency. Under Article 15 the European Convention identifies the right to life (Article 2), the prohibition of
torture (Article 3), the prohibition of slavery and forced labor (Article 4), and the prohibition of punishment
without law (Article 7) as non-derogable; Survey of Activity 1950-1998, pps. 27-77.
75
Irelandv. UK (No. 5310/71) 18 January 1978 ; McCann and others v. UK (No. 19009/04) 13 May 2008
16
Chahalv. UK (No. 70/1995/576/662) 15 November 1996; and Soeringv. UK (No. 14038/88) 7 July 1989
77

Welch v. UK (No. 17440/90) 26 February 1996
™* Tyrer v. UK (No. 5856/72) 25 April 1978
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7,856 total violations.””

Forty-six per cent®’ of these violations were attributable to member

states from Eastern and Central Europe, which is rather high considering their relatively new
membership.

Furthermore,

given the number of pending cases*' and the presence of armed

conflict in that region, one may predict a steady rise in the proportion of cases involving nonderogable rights.

Returning to the discussion of Part II, the changing nature of the ECHR's caseload
reinforces the Court's backlog as greater resources are allocated to a minority of cases.

A

conscious decision by the Court to concentrate its efforts on more complex and serious cases has
resulted in a lower total output of judgments.

Because these fundamental rights “enshrine one of

the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe”,® they are subject
to “the most careful scrutiny”®’ by the Court and receive more time and attention than other
cases.

For

example,

substantial

resources

are

needed

to

establish

facts

which

remain

fundamentally disputed in cases concerning allegations of grave human rights abuses.**

The

ECHR must conduct difficult and costly fact-finding hearings (by hearing witnesses) and on-thespot investigations when domestic courts are unable or unwilling to carry out any form of their
own investigation into allegations. A significant number of these hearings can take up to a week
and involve at least five or six ECHR officials (usually three judges, a registrar, and lawyers) and
interpreters.®°

85

In a fact-finding mission organized for Druzenko and others v. Ukraine*®, three

Court Judges were required to travel to a Ukrainian prison in order to gather evidence from
79

81

The European Court of Human Rights, Some Facts and Figures 1998-2008
The European Court of Human Rights, Some Facts and Figures 1998-2008
According to the ECHR's 2008 Annual Report, 72,000 cases from Eastern and Central Europe were pending
before a judicial formation

® McCann v UK, No. 18984/91, 1996 paragraph 147
8 Gul v Turkey, No. 22676/93, 2002 paragraph 78
Greer, Steven, Laurence Gormley, and Jo Shaw. The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements,
Problems and Prospects. New York: Cambridge UP, 2006: 40

Leach, p. 65
8° Druzenko and Others v. Ukraine, No. 17674/02 and 3908 1/02
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witnesses and research

accusations of inhuman

government refused its own investigation.

and degrading treatment after the domestic

In another case, Shamayev and 12 others v. Georgia

and Russia,*’ the ECHR coordinated a fact-finding mission in September of 2003 to Russia when
domestic authorities would not allow the Court or the applicants' representatives to contact the
applicants. *®

After the Russian government tried to halt the mission in October, Strasbourg

issued a reminder of Russia's obligation to the European Convention and the investigation finally
advanced.*”

Although it was eventually determined that no violations had been committed, the

fact finding mission

illustrates how cases concerning non-derogable rights may

disproportionate share of the Court's resources.

consume

a

As a result of the ECHR's decision to focus on

more complex cases in 2007, there were 4 per cent fewer judgments delivered than in 2006 and
cases pending before a judicial formation grew by 19 per cent within the year.”
In addition to reinforcing the backlog, the changing nature of violations has transformed
the Court's role from one of “fine-tuning well-established and well-functioning democracies

91

to

that of an “adjudicator in transition,” drawn into the process of democratic transformation and
consolidation.”

In other words, incomplete reform in Eastern Europe has generated cases which

require the Court to participate in the establishment of democracy, as opposed to its fine-tuning.
The creation of a genuinely independent judiciary or a major improvement in prison conditions,
for instance, requires long and sustained efforts of reform.

It is now more important than ever

for individual cases to establish clear interpretive rules which provide a general jurisprudential
87

Shamayev and 12 Others v. Georgia and Russia, No. 36378/02, 12 April 2005

*

Registrar of the ECHR, Shamayev and 12 others v. Georgia and Russia, No. 36378/02, Press Release No. 455,
September 19, 2003 [online].

© Registrar of the ECHR, Shamayev and 12 others v. Georgia and Russia, No. 36378/02, Press Release No. 524,
October 24, 2003 [online].

Annual Survey 2007, p.134
*'
92

Mahoney, Paul. “New Challenges for the European Court of Human Rights Resulting from the Expanding Case
Load and Membership”, Penn State International Law Review. 21(2002), 110-111.
Robert Harmsen , "The European Convention on Human Rights after Enlargement." The International Journal of
Human Rights Winter 5 (2001): 30.

24

doctrine. Should member states abide by the guidelines set forth in the European Convention (to
be discussed in greater detail in Part IV), attention to established case law will help states

identify their weaknesses and sometimes even specifically spell out the way to begin reform.
To summarize, the COE’s expansion to Eastern and Central Europe has affected not only
the size but also the character of the Court’s caseload. The ECHR now regularly deals with cases
which raise complex issues involving the violation of core rights to physical security. The Court
must invest more resources in the investigation and resolution of every case which ultimately

intensifies the already demanding backlog.

| Because these complex cases deal mainly with

Eastern and Central Europe’s transition to democracy, the Court has transformed from that of a
fine-tuner to an adjudicator preparing the ground for democratic institutions.

PART IV
COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS
In recent years, the failure of certain member states to meet judgment obligations has
undermined the Court's effectiveness.

As explained below, recurring patterns of violations,

which give rise to this phenomenon, occur mainly under the responsibility of Eastern and Central
Europe's emerging democracies.

In consequence, the Court suffers from drained resources and

diminished authority which inhibit its ability to safeguard individuals’ rights.
Under the European Convention, states “undertake to abide by the final judgment of the
Court in any case to which they are parties. "3 The Committee of Ministers is responsible for the
supervision of the execution of the Court's judgments.

Member states must demonstrate to the

Committee the cessation of the particular violation, erasing its consequences as far as possible,
®

Article 46, European Convention
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and the prevention of similar violations from reoccurring.
entails payment of just satisfaction.’
of compensation,

compliance

Among other things, this normally

Because the Court's judgments clearly define the measure

involves

a relatively

simple

task.

In 2007,

however,

just

satisfaction awarded to applicants averaged out to €25,182 for the total number of new cases
examined by the Committee of Ministers.”

95

This figure is quite small in comparison to the

damages awarded at the similar Inter-American Court of Human Rights which often amount to
tens of thousands of dollars. °°

In certain cases, just satisfaction cannot adequately remedy
applicant.

injuries suffered by an

Therefore, depending on the circumstances, judgments may also require respondent

states to take individual measures in favor of the applicant.

Individual measures are taken in

order to ensure that the injured party be put, as far as possible, in the same situation he or she
enjoyed before the violation occurred.

This may include the re-opening of unfair proceedings,

the destruction of information gathered in breach of the right to privacy, the revocation of a
deportation order issued despite the risk of inhumane treatment in the country of destination, etc.
For example, in Kutic (and 18 other similar applications) v. Croatia,’ domestic authorities had
to correct the consequences of a violation in addition to making payments of just satisfaction.
The case concerns their compensation claims, lodged with Zagreb Municipal Court, following
various explosions which destroyed their property - their house in Martinec village (Croatia), on

*

95

If the law of the contracting state only allows for partial reparations to be made, the Court may afford just
satisfaction to the injured party under Article 41 of the European Convention. This payment is typically a sum of
money to cover pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in addition to costs and expenses.
“First Annual Report (2001) of the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments of the ECHR”. Committee of
Ministers (COE) p. 227. Can be found at:
http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/execution/CM_annreport2007_en.pdf
La Canta v. Peru, Series C No. 162, 26 November 2006. para. 219(i); Boyce et al. v. Barbados - Series C No.
169, 20 November 2007. para. 132; Saramaka People v. Suriname, Series C No. 172, 28 November 2007. para.

97

208; Additional representative cases may be found at: <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos.cfm>
Kutic v. Croatia (No. 48778/99) 01 March 2002. (The 18 other similar cases being Multiplex, Culjak, Kastelic,
Acimovic, Cmojevic, Varicak, Freimann, Dragovic, Marinkovic, Dragicevic, Zovanovic, Pikic, Peic, Nevenka I
Milorad Mihajlovic, Kljajic, Lulic and Becker, Zadro, Urukalo, and Nemet v. Croatia.)
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26 December 1991, and, their garage and the adjacent storage room and a meat-curing shed in

Bjelovar, on 13 November 1994. The local court stayed both sets of proceedings, in accordance
with an amendment to the Civil Obligations Act introduced on 17 January 1996 by the Croatian
Parliament.

The

amendment

provides that all proceedings

concerning

actions for damage

resulting from terrorist acts be stayed pending the enactment of new legislation on the subject.
After waiting several years for new legislation, the applicant submitted complaints to the ECHR,

which found that Croatia had violated the applicant's right to a fair trial under Article 6. Obliged
to comply with Court judgments, the Croatian Supreme Court awarded the applicant damages of
€10,000 and adopted a resolution instructing the competent courts to resume all civil proceedings
stayed under the 1996 legislation and without a specific request from the parties.
also illustrates the general (rather than individual) measures
undertake to prevent the recurrence of similar violations.

This remedy

which respondent states must

To that end, the Croatian Parliament

passed a law in 2003 enabling the determination of civil claims that involve damage

from

terrorist acts. While this law helped remedy violations found for individuals’ cases, the action as
a whole prevents such a violation from becoming a concern again.
Although states have an obligation to respect the Court's judgments, they enjoy wide
latitude in choosing the means of interpretation.
Department of the execution of judgments)

The Committee of Ministers (assisted by the

does, however, ensure that measures taken are

appropriate and actually achieve the outcome sought in the Court's judgment.

Additionally, the

ECHR can itself directly require member states to take certain measures as it deems necessary;
albeit this possibility was not utilized until 2004 for the cases Assanidze v. Georgia®® and Ilascu
and others v. Russia and Moldova.”

In both cases Grand Chambers'” held unanimously that the

8 Assanidze v. Georgia, No. 71503/01, 8 April 2004
® Tlascu and others y. Russia and Moldova, No. 48 787/99, 8 July 2004
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respective states must secure the immediate release of applicants who were being arbitrarily
detained in breach of Article 5 of the Convention.

|

Evolutionin the number of new cases forwarded to the

|

Conunittee of Ministers and in the number of cases pending
for execution.
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In spite of the Court and Committee's efforts to prevent the recurrence of particular
violations, statistics in the figure above clearly demonstrate a remarkable increase over recent
years in the number of new cases transmitted to the Committee of Ministers and the number of
cases pending for supervision of execution.'°!

There is no indication that the Committee's

workload will lessen unless the volume of new cases submitted for supervision can drop over a
sustained period.

Eighty per cent of new cases submitted to the Committee

in 2007 were

categorized as clone or repetitive cases,'* meaning that they reflect a systemic or general
problem already raised before the EHCR in leading cases!” and, therefore, make no significant

© Tn cases which are considered to raise important issues, a chamber may relinquish its jurisdiction to a grand
chamber of 17 judges (under Article 30; rule 72). A case can be relinquished to the grand chamber at any time
before a chamber has given its judgment, however, it is possibly for one party to the case to object to the
relinquishment.
0! «First Annual Report (2007) of the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments of the ECHR”. Committee of
Ministers p. 13. Can be found at: <http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/execution/CM_annreport2007_en.pdf>
'® «First annual report on the supervision of the execution of judgments”. Committee of Ministers (2008): 218
3 Cases which reveal a new systemic/general problem in a respondent state and which thus require the adoption of
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contribution to the case-law of the Court.

Rather, these cases signal member states’ failure to

exercise preventative individual or general measures effectively.
Because most repetitive cases concern underlying structural problems within a state, they
make up a large proportion of applications filed against Eastern and Central European members
still transitioning to democracy.

As mentioned in the discussion in Part II, many states from this

region were allowed to enter the COE

protection.

with fragile political systems and methods of rights

Given that perhaps the most attractive prize in the gift of the Council of Europe is

membership itself, conceding it at an early stage in a process of democratic transition runs the
risk of lackadaisical compliance with Convention obligations.

This is only offset by the fact that

members who wish to join the EU and NATO must prove their conformity to the “shared values”
of Europe and, therefore, are more likely to execute obligations.’ Additionally, the COE can do
little with a state persistently in violation, short of suspending its voting rights on the Committee
of Ministers or expelling it from the organization altogether, neither of which is likely in any but
the most extreme circumstances to prove productive.’ These circumstances allow some states,
such as Russia, to value sovereignty over their pledge to observe key European human rights
norms.'"° As a result, allegations against transitioning democracies increasingly deal with issues
already addressed by the Court.

An average of almost 60 per cent of new cases examined in

2007 against the twenty-two member states from Eastern and Central Europe were categorized as
repetitive, in contrast to the 35 per cent average from Western Europe.'*”

new general measures, more or less important according to the case(s).
' Editors, “Walter Schwimmer, Timid Moral Policeman,” The Economist. 27 Nov. 1999, p. 56
'’ “Protocol No. 14 to Convention”, para. 100
" P Jordan, “Does Membership Have Its Priveledges?: Entrance into the Council of Europe and Compliance with
Human Rights Norms”, Human Rights Quarterly 25 (2003): p. 686
107
First Annual Report (2007) of the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments of the ECHR”. Committee of
Ministers (COE) p. 217-218. Can be found at:
http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/execution/CM_annreport2007_en.pdf
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Types of new cases examined by CM in 2007
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As shown above, the greatest absolute numbers of repetitive cases examined by the
Committee

in 2007

came

from (in respective order) Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Poland,

Romania — representing the vast majority of cases for each state.'°°

and

As noted by its former

President Wilderhaber, repeated findings of violations which have no obvious effect in the state
concerned seriously undermine the Court's credibility. 109

Recently, in an effort to combat the

growing proportion of repetitive cases, the Court has started providing better identification of the
issues found underlying violations and giving indications as to the execution measures required.
For example, in the case of Broniowski v. Poland,''® the Court held that expropriation by the
government (of property belonging to the applicant east of the Bug River which Poland ceded to
the Soviet Union after the Second World War) constituted a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 because inadequate compensation had been paid. The Court expressly stated that the violation
(8 Data in graph gathered from: First Annual Report (2007) of the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments of the
ECHR”. Committee of Ministers (COE) p. 218-220. Can be found at:

http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/execution/CM_annreport2007_en.pdf

1 | Wilderhaber, “The Role of the ECHR: An Evaluation”, Mediterranean Journal of Human Rights, 8 (2004) 932 at 27

110 Broniowski v. Poland (No. 31443/96), 22 June 2004
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of the applicant's right “originated in a widespread problem which resulted from a malfunction of

Polish legislation and administrative practice and which has affected and remains capable of
affecting a large number

of persons”.'''

It therefore required Poland to adapt appropriate

measures to secure an adequate right of compensation or redress, not just for this particular

applicant, but for all similar claimants.''? This was the first time that the Court had used what
has become known

as a “pilot judgment” procedure as a device for dealing with systemic

problems. Following that judgment,

in July 2005 the Polish Government passed a new law

setting the ceiling for compensation for Bug River property at 20% of its original value.''? This
saved the ECHR an enormous amount of time and labor by dealing with all the 167 related cases
pending before it and giving a solution for the 80,000 Bug River potential applicants within a
single judgment.

Solutions created on the basis of a single case, however, may not reveal the

different aspects of the systemic problem involved and should not be wholly relied upon to
deliver the ECHR from its burdens.

Additionally, the pilot case approach only works for states

willing to systematically oblige to the pilot judgment in all future cases.

For these reasons,

respect of the European Convention and, in particular, of the Court's judgments, is a crucial
element of the Council of Europe's system for the protection of human rights, rule of law and
democracy. |"
Full execution

of judgments

is necessary

to enhance

the Court's

prestige

and

the

effectiveness of its action and has the effect of limiting the number of applications submitted to
it. Given that “the acid test of any judicial system is how promptly and effectively judgments are

'' (2005) 40 EHRR 495 at para. 189
' (2005) 40 EHRR 495 at para. 200
'® Press release issued by the Registrar, “First 'pilot judgment’ procedure brought to a successful conclusion:
River cases closed”
' Execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe. 24 Mar. 2009
<http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_rights/execution/>.
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implemented,”'!° one may reasonably conclude the current ECHR system's legitimacy to be in
serious danger.

Until the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe can allow for the full

harmonization of domestic law with that of the European Convention, repetitive cases will
continue to make up a majority of the Court's caseload.

PART V
LESSONS LEARNED
The COE's experience with complete pan-continental membership (excluding Belarus)
could be valuable to other international organizations seeking expansion.
and Central European states’ effect on the ECHR

In particular, Eastern

may serve as a powerful warning to the

European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, two very influential organizations
which have already implemented multiple stages of eastward expansion.

Problems in the ECHR

resulting from the premature inclusion of members transitioning to democracy, such as strained
resources and altered goals, exemplify the need for great caution with international growth.
As argued in preceding sections, the ECHR’s current limitations are rooted in the political
and judicial weaknesses of new members.

The COE's policy of rapid expansion offered little

time for member states to resolve underlying structural deficiencies contributing to systemic
human rights violations.

Internal issues of stability demand a transitioning state's full attention,

making concentration on external obligations difficult.

By accepting states into the COE before

such shortcomings were fully addressed, the ECHR opened itself to their vulnerabilities while
also giving those states only interested in membership little incentive to improve.

The resources

of the ECHR were taxed beyond capacity as the needs of new, weaker members grew.

Of greater

5 CDDH, “Guaranteeing Long-Term Effectiveness”, April 2003, p. 34, para. |

32

concern, however,

is how

the nature of the Court’s focus shifted as it began accommodating

these transitioning democracies.
With that said, it is interesting that the EU and NATO
stages of expansion into Eastern and Central Europe.

have already initiated multiple

In 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia,

Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia became the first Eastern European

members

to join

the

EU

and

in 2007,

membership to Bulgaria and Romania.

the enlargement

continued

with

an extension

of

The European Council''® deemed these states to have

met EU membership accession criteria which include: political stability and respect for the rule
of law and human rights, a functioning and competitive market economy, and lastly adherence to

the aims of the political, economic, and monetary union.''’

Similarly NATO found several

Eastern and Central European states eligible for membership after it concluded that they were not
only democratically and economically stable but also committed to the peaceful resolution of
conflicts and able to make military contributions in NATO operations.''® This allowed the Czech
Republic, Hungary,

Romania,

and Poland

to join NATO

in 1999; Bulgaria, Estonia,

Latvia,

Lithuania,

Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004; and predictably Croatia and Albania will accept

membership this year.

Other Eastern and Central European states which have yet to show

substantial progress in their democratization will likely not be granted membership to either the
EU or NATO until conformity to Western ideals and standards are clearly observed.
Despite exercising caution in their expansion policies, the EU and NATO have already
experienced threats to their effectiveness at the hands of transitioning democracies.

Both

organizations are controlled by states with great economic, political, and military power, which

''6 The European Council gathers together the heads of state or government of the member states of the European
Union and the President of the Commission.
"7 http://europa.ew/scadplus/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm
"8 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm#1995

33

these members risk under expansion to weaker states.

For example, the European

Union’s

comfortable authority in the international market, particularly its 30 per cent share of the nominal
gross world product, !!? is currently at stake due to unstable Eastern European economies.

The

recent global economic downturn has exposed the financial fragility of new Eastern European
members “fed from the tidal wave of liquidity and easy money”.'””

Imploding financial systems

upset the EU’s single market system and demonstrate the vulnerability Eastern and Central
Europe may bring to the organization’s economic success. The EU is now faced with the task of
deciding whether and how members should help their weaker brethren.'*! The European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank and the World Bank said they
would jointly provide $31.1 billion to support Eastern European nations, but much more will be
needed to deliver fragile states from ruin.'”*

22

Only five years after expansion, the EU has

noticeably shifted its focus from fostering regional economic prosperity to simply ensuring the
economic stability of all its members.

Each member state’s level of contribution to the EU’s

budget further emphasizes the strain that new members place on the organization’s resources. As
shown in the chart below,'*? most Western states' net benefit (the money received minus that
contributed) from the European Union's budget amounts to negative figures.

124

Clearly, states

from the former Soviet bloc make up the overwhelming majority of those receiving the most EU
'? World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008 Edition. International Monetary Fund. April 2008.
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/0 1/weodata/weorept.aspxsy=2006&ey=2008&ssd=1 &sort=coun
try&ds=.&br=1 &c=998&s=NGDPD%2CPPPGDP&grp=1
&a=1
&pr.x=46&pr.y=7>
0 Saltmarsh, Matthew. "Eastern Europe showing new vulnerability." International Herlad Tribune [New York] 17
Feb. 2009. <www.iht.com>.
" Maddox, Bronwen. "EU must pay price to keep Eastern poor relations in the family." The Times [London] 3
Mar. 2009, World sec.
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/bronwen_maddox/article5835067.ece>
'2 Castle, Stephen, and Steven Erlanger. "Growing Economic Crisis Threatens the Idea of One Europe." The New
York Times, New York ed.: A1.
‘
"3 Data represents an estimate of the EU-27 budget for the years 2007-2013. Statistics collected from: Briefing
note: European Communities (Finance) Bill. Issue brief. 2007. Open Europe. 20 Apr. 2009: p. 3
<http://www.openeurope.org.uk/research/budget07.pdf>
124
Figures for both Luxembourg and Belgium may be inflated due to the large number of companies based there
with subsidiaries located in another state.
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expenses.

Just as with the ECHR, organizational resources are threatened by the presence of

states not fully prepared for the demands of membership.
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The character of NATO has also experienced dramatic changes as former Warsaw Pact states!”

find a growing representation in the Alliance.

Because the fall of the Soviet bloc disassembled

the main adversary of NATO, the organization was forced to reevaluate its existence.

NATO

now aims to ensure multilateral military cooperation and guarantee international peace and

"5 The Warsaw Pact was created in 1955 as the communist response to NATO. It was founded by Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union. The German Democratic Republic joined
later in 1956.
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security;!”°

however,

expansion

to

Eastern

Europe

has

encouraged

organization’s members'*’ as well as with longtime rival Russia.

tensions

between

the

In fact, NATO’s plans for

expansion towards Russia likely exacerbated the circumstances leading up to conflict in South

Ossetia last year.'**

28

The inclusion of economically weaker new members from Eastern and

Central Europe strains NATO’s burden sharing budget system which is based upon per capita
Gpp.'”

As the organization expands, it incurs additional costs to accommodate

members.

the new

While new members contribute to such costs, older and financially stable members

end up paying the most.'*°
Just as with the ECHR, the premature extension of membership to the transitioning
democracies of Eastern and Central Europe could pose a serious threat to the goals of an
international organization.

The uneven development levels of EU member states currently strain

the organization’s solidarity under the financial crisis and causes delays in decisions on economic
recovery.'!

1

Not only are the organization's resources now turned to the East but its goal for

economic prosperity has been replaced with simply stability.

Additionally, new members to

NATO unable to build up substantial defenses on their own rely on the military assistance of
allies.

Eastern European

states anxious to thwart Russian aggression demand

preemptive

protection, causing strife within NATO over plans such as building missile defense shields and
"6 “Welcome to NATO." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 10 Mar. 2009 <http://www.nato.int/natowelcome/index.htm|>; Wallander, Celeste. "NATO's Price: Shape Up or Ship Out." Foreign Affairs. Dec. 2002.
The Council on Foreign Relations. 10 Mar. 2009. <www. foreignaffairs.org>

7 Kupchan, Charles A. "NATO divided." International Herald Tribune 9 Apr. 2008. 11 Mar. 2009
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/09/opinion/edkupchan.php>.
"8 Friedman, Thomas. "What did we expect?" New York Times 20 Aug. 2008, New York ed., Op-Ed sec.: A23;
"Putin warns NATO expansion ‘is direct threat to security of Russia" The Australian [Sydney] 7 Apr. 2008, Ist
ed., World sec.: 13.
" "NATO Handbook." 2006. NATO. 20 Apr. 2009: p.57 <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2006/hb-en-

2006.pdf>.
' Ek, Carl W. NATO Common Funds Burdensharing: Background and Current Issues. Rep. no. RL30150. 20 Jan.
2006. Congressional Research Services. 20 Apr. 2009 <http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/data/2006/uplmeta-pcc-1156153389knordstr_nt104619_unt/RL30150_2006Jan20.pdf>.
"! Castle, Stephen, and Steven Erlanger. "Growing Economic Crisis Threatens the Idea of One Europe."The New
York Times, New York ed.: Al.
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diminishing

the

ability

of the

organization

to act

harmoniously. '*

These

developments

underscore the need for caution when considering expansion to Eastern and Central Europe.

CONCLUSION
After experiencing a rapid expansion of jurisdiction beyond the traditional geo-political

boundaries of the Cold War, the ECHR

found itself challenged by the poor human rights

background of its latest members. The new Eastern and Central European members brought with
them many of the problems now threatening the Court such as an overwhelming caseload, a rise
in serious violations to non-derogable rights, and low compliance with judgments.
these developments

have

taken

a toll on the ECHR’s

capacity to fully process

applications, thus reducing its ability to protect human rights in Europe.

Altogether
received

While the ECHR has

executed the protection of individual’s rights more effectively than any other trans-national
process, its continued success now faces an uncertain future.
A high symbolic 10,000th'* judgment delivered on 18 September 2008 for the case of
Takhayeva and Others v. Russia'** represented not only the Court's accomplishments but also the
challenges which it has increasingly encountered over the past two decades.

For example, when

this case was allocated to a decision body in 2004 along with 32,490 others,'** the ECHR had it
backlogged due to the characteristically high influx of applications. The Court currently requires
"2 Lobjakas, Ahto. "NATO split over Baltic defense." Asia Times Online 9 Oct. 2008. World News Network. 10
Mar. 2009 <http://article.wn.com/view/2008/10/08/NATO_split_over_Baltic_defense/>; Lok, Joris Janssen.
"NATO Struggles With Missile Defense." 10 June 2007. Aviation Week and Space Technology. 11 Mar. 2009
<http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/aw061107p2.xml>.
"3 Registrar press release. “The European Court of Human Rights delivers its 10 000" judgment.” The European
Court of Human Rights. 18 Sept 2008.
<http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp
1 97/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=takhayeva%20%7C
%2023286/04&sessionid=2 1084097&skin=hudoc-pr-en>.
'* Takhayeva and Others v. Russia (no. 23286/04)18 Sept 2008; Registrar press release. “The European Court of
Human Rights delivers its 10 000" judgment.” The European Court of Human Rights. 18 Sept 2008.
135
“Some Facts and Figures of the European Court of Human Rights: 1998-2008”. Council of Europe. Nov. 2008,
p. 15.
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approximately five years to fully process a case — a time period which threatens an applicant's

right to a fair and expeditious trial under the European Convention.'*®

Although a slight

exception to the trend, Zakhayeva and Others v. Russia took four years to receive a final
judgment from the Court.

Furthermore, the nature of the applicants’ complaints concerned

serious violations of rights to physical security.

Non-derogable right violations have become

more prevalent in recent years, especially in areas suffering from armed conflict such as
Chechnya. In Zakhayeva and Others v. Russia, the ECHR found violations of Articles 2 (right to

life), 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), 5 (right to liberty and security) and 13
(right to an effective remedy), all concerning the abduction of the applicants’ relative from their
village in Chechnya by Russian servicemen.'*”

Such politically sensitive cases require the Court

to expend greater resources gathering crucial information from applicants and member states.

Additionally, the high volume of similar allegations against Russia for violations of nonderogable rights during anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya signal Russia's failure to take
individual and general measures for the applicant's remedy and prevention of the violation's
recurrence. What is more, the high level of applications from the Chechen region illustrates the
presence of systemic problems in Russia’s human rights policies which is something that the
ECHR must now take upon itself to correct. The extra workload only strains the Court’s already
limited resources and threatens its overall effectiveness.

with one of its members

provides

an invaluable

In this instance, the Court’s experience

indication of expansion’s

costs to other

organizations such as the EU and NATO.

Despite the aforementioned obstacles to the delivery of Court's judgments, it is the only
"6 Article 6 of the European Convention
"7 Registrar press release. “The European Court of Human Rights delivers its 10 000" judgment.” The European
Court of Human Rights. 18 Sept 2008.
<http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp 197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=takhayeva%20%7C
%2023286/04&sessionid=2
1084097 &skin=hudoc-pr-en>.
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ternational human rights court able to claim such a high output of judgments,

This year the

ECHR celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, where ECHR
President Jean Paul Costa presented a
speech not only emphasizing the vast improvements
made in the realm of human rights but also
,
.
nee for the Court’s continued presence .
in a Europe where xenophob
phobi
i a, racis
i m and intol
i
erance

«4, 138
still reside.

ee
138

E

Speech by President of the European Court of Human Rights, Mr Jean-Paul Costa. Solemn hearing of the

uropean Court of Human Rights on the occasion of the opening of the judicial year. 30 January 2009.
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